10 April 1973.
Page 2
History and Related Events (continued):
“Although Sadat [President of Egypt] and Assad [President of Syria] had reached agreement in March 1973 for a joint offensive, they had yet to decide on their precise timetable. At first, the Egyptians president was inclined to launch the operation in May, but moved the date back upon learning that a Nixon-Brezhnev conference was scheduled for that month; he did not wish to embarrass his Soviet patrons. Eventually, October 6 was decided upon. The water table of the Canal would be low then, the moon high for night crossings. Politically and diplomatically, also, the time would never be more opportune. Israel’s position had weakened in Africa, Europe was less than forthright in its own leadership, and the Nixon administration was bedeviled by the Watergate scandal. The Israelis would be preoccupied with their own election campaign, they would be worshipping and fasting on their holy day of Yom Kippur, and in any case they would hardly expect an attack during the Moslem festival of Ramadan.” “Throughout June and July . . . Sadat conducted secret political discussions with representatives of the Hashemite government, and he finally dispelled Hussein’s misgivings. On September 10, Hussein [King of Jordan] and Assad arrived in Cairo, and tactical agrement was reached for the impending offensive. Hussein for his part admitted his inability to conduct full-scale warfore, but consented at least to pose the threat of attack across the Jordan, thereby tying down Israeli forces on the West Bank. On this basis, the agreement was sealed.
“It remained later only to win assurance of Soviet military backing. That support was by no means to be taken for granted.” Thus Egypt, Syria and Jordan stealthily laid plans for the 6-28 October 1973 Yom Kippur War.” Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY, 1996. Pp. 749-750; 548-549.
Observations and Comments:
Yehuveh was monitoring these developments and again clearly stated the outcome Egypt would suffer for this offensive: “Son of man, I have broken the arm of Pharaoh king of Egypt; and, lo, it shall not be bound up to be healed, to put a roller to bind it, to make it strong to hold the sword. Therefore thus saith Yehuveh Elohim; Behold, I am against Pharaoh king of Egypt, and will break his arms, the strong, and that which was broken; and I will cause the sword to fall out of his hand.” After the war, “The Egyptians had suffered 7,700 combat dead, the Syrians 3,500. The Israelis held 9,000 POW’s, of whom over 8,000 were Egyptian. The combined Arab forces had lost some 2,000 tanks and over 500 planes, compared withrael’s loss of 804 tanks and 114 planes.” Ibid, p. 786; Ezekiel 30:21-22.
Gael Bataman
Originally Written: 16 November 2007
Latest Update: 20 November 2007
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